Monthly Archives: March 2006

Sony: Great Brand, Crappy Strategy

Two rather conflicting bits of news for Sony today. On one hand, a survey revealed that the Sony brand is stronger than Nintendo’s, and much stronger than Microsoft’s. (Forrester Research, which conducted the survey, went on to claim that “Microsoft faces big consumer defection risk.” Ouch.)

On the other hand, rumors abound that Walmart will quit the UMD business. Universal Studios has already ceased UMD production. Losing Walmart is a bit like having your legs chopped off. I wonder: if UMDs had cost half as much, would consumers have stuck with the format? The price always seemed excessive… to me at least.

It’s strange to witness such a mismatch between technical achievement, great branding, and questionable strategy. Why is Sony obsessed with expensive proprietary formats that almost inevitably generate apathy (if not resentment)? Why did it take the company so long to realize that, shocker of shockers, an online service would be important in next-gen consoles? Why is Sony letting the Nintendo Revolution run away with the physical gaming market, when the Eye Toy has been around for years? Where is Sony’s next-gen response?

I know, I know. It’s easy to criticize from the bleachers. They’ve got smart people who’ve managed to win two console wars in a row. And maybe these missteps don’t matter, since brand strength may preserve Sony’s dominance in the console market. Then again, I’m guessing that Nintendo had A+ brand strength with consumers once… before the GameCube?

VC watch: LimeLife (maker of mobile games for women) just raised $10M, and Linden Lab (maker of Second Life) raised $11M from some rather impressive sources, including Jeff Bezos and Mitch Kapor. Nintendo Revolution 1st-party titles will not exceed $50 … Continue reading

Serious Games: Soul-Searching

There’s been quite a bit of soul-searching in the serious games community as of late. Some smart, dedicated people are wondering why the serious game market hasn’t taken off yet, why it isn’t swimming in funds (governmental, non-profit, or corporate), and why developers generally don’t take this stuff, well… seriously.

Unfortunately, the phrase “serious games” has come to encapsulate so much that I find it difficult to say anything meaningful on the subject. For example, I think developments in the “games for health” space are quite promising (and I know that corporations like Nintendo, Sony, and Konami would agree.) On the other hand, the “games for education” space — arguably the standard-bearer for the serious games movement — is really struggling. So I’m going to focus this post on games for education.

The educational game movement has a problem. Most people on the street can’t name a “commercially-successful” educational title. Those who can will inevitably name Oregon Trail or Where in the World is Carmen Sandiego, neither of which were actually all that educational. And they’re both so old! What’s up with that?

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Via Clickable Culture, a first-person account of advertising in games gone awry. An Anarchy Online player writes: “in the main room in each store is a great big video billboard, and this board plays the same 15 second trailer for … Continue reading

Overall, a great conference, as always. I enjoyed most of the design-centric panels and lectures that I attended. The business-centric sessions were a little too “MBA 101-ish” for my taste (though I’m sure many attendees appreciated them). If any of … Continue reading

GDC: Wideload Production Model (Distributed Outsourcing)

Yes, I know that GDC has been over for a couple of days, but I spent the weekend blissfully pretending that game development is a figment of my imagination. So sue me.  ;-)

Anyway, on Friday I attended a lecture entitled: “Creating Stubbs the Zombie with the Wideload Model”. Stubbs the Zombie is a moderately successful, humorous FPS. Wideload is the developer; the “Wideload model” is basically using a very small core team to manage many independent contractors. You may have read about this in Game Developer Magazine. For those who didn’t:

Wideload had a core production team of about ten people. Despite professing to some rather astonishing mistakes (for example, not hiring a single producer), Wideload managed to get Stubbs out the door just a few months behind schedule. The model, which they plan to stick with in the future, had the following benefits:

  • Maintaining a very small core team made it possible to turn down undesirable contracts that most other developers would ultimately be forced to accept.
  • Contractors were paid a fixed price for assets, not an hourly rate, so project delays were less of a problem than normal. [Sounds great -- but delays can negatively impact marketing campaigns, not just development budgets. I'd like to know how Wideload dealt with that.]

There were a fairly large number of bumps in the road, many of which (but not all) can be rectified in future projects:

  • Stubbs was based on a proprietary (and undocumented) engine, which made life much more difficult than it needed to be for contractors. Next time: go with a popular engine.
  • Wideload didn’t create a variety of reference assets before selecting contractors, which meant that contractors weren’t sure what was expected of them. Unsurprisingly, some contractors proved unprepared to meet Wideload’s standards.
  • Potential contractors weren’t tested thoroughly enough prior to signup … again, resulting in sub-standard work.
  • Wideload did not attempt to ascertain whether contractors were well-managed and well-funded enough to remain solvent throughout the life of the project. Due-diligence.
  • Development was afflicted by longer-than-normal feedback delays [probably inevitable with so many different parties working independently of one another].
  • As noted earlier, not nearly enough dedicated production talent within the core team.
  • Contractors were expected to “crunch” when under pressure, the way full-time employees do. No such luck.
  • Assets required substantially more post-production polish than normal. [Multi-project relationships and better processes may reduce this problem over time, but it is unlikely to ever disappear.]

GDC: Nintendo, Will Wright

Gotta make this fast — I’m late for a meeting.

The Nintendo keynote was remarkable for its almost total lack of information about (or hype around) the Revolution console. Satoru Iwata focused primarily on his overall theme (disruptive innovation), some game demos, and the DS in general. The underlying message, of course, was “stop focusing on raw power — start focusing on interesting features, accessibility, and games for the true mass market as well as the hardcore”. My totally subjective observation: the crowd appeared more engaged during this keynote than during Sony’s keynote. Giving away copies of Brain Training to all attendees at the end was very smart.

Will Wright’s keynote inspired joy, deep thought, and relentless feelings of inadequacy.  ;-)  He is an amazing presenter and thinker — absolutely the highlight of GDC ’06. I had assumed that there would be a full transcript of it (if not video) available online by now, but I can’t find anything worth linking to. Very frustrating. So: Will talked about what he does in the earliest stages of the game design process. He managed to weave astrobiology, aliens, and robots into the presentation on a regular basis. Pure magic. If a video surfaces I will absolutely link to it for you.

GDC: My Wednesday Was Totally Random

Sony’s keynote was interesting, if rather devoid of new information. Experimental gameplay session was very cool — there was a game where you build a tower of hands that catch umbrellas and use them to shield paper boats from the rain. Very weird / cool.

As usual, the guys from Harmonix were treated like, well, guitar heroes, despite the fact that they had some trouble with their experimental exhibition, which did not diminish the simple fact that guitar hero was being played in a new way, which everyone was happy to see! They had attempted to do some neat freestyle stuff with the game (where you play what you want to, as opposed to a given song on a script), and it hadn’t quite worked out (in the lab, or in the demo.) But the concept was fantastic, and I was thrilled to hear that they will attempt it again in next-gen versions of the game.  :-)

GDC: Casual Games Summit

I had to get up at 5:30am this morning in order to have time to write something for Game Tycoon. This is really testing my newfound infatuation with blogging.  ;-)

Slipped into the Casual Games Summit for a bit yesterday. Thankfully, there was little of the (formerly common) griping about “we don’t get no respect” — a definite sign that the market is maturing. Other signs that the market is maturing (as noted by Dave Rohrl, GM of Popcap’s San Francisco studio):

  • Team size is now 3-5 (as opposed to 1-3 in the very recent past).
  • Development schedules are now 6-12 months (as opposed to 3).
  • Development costs are $100K-$250K or more (as opposed to $25K-$100K).
  • The market has become extremely crowded, and consumers are learning to expect more from casual games. Dave hypothesized that the games which defined this genre several years ago would no longer make the cut in today’s environment.

In a subsequent panel, James Gwertzman (Director of Biz Dev for Popcap) made the following pronouncements:

  • Casual games need to be modified on a partner-by-partner basis to help the major game portals differentiate their offerings. Not core modifications, but things like better integration with a partner’s DRM solution, leaderboards, etc. James said it was affordable to do this for five or six companies: an unsurprising assessment, and bad news for portals below tier 1 (tier 2 and below represent just 10% of Popcap’s audience).
  • New customers are always flowing into the market, so you can’t ever stop making really simple, accessible games that suck people in.
  • No matter how powerful portals gets, Popcap can make must-have games that preserve its power in the chain. (My opinion: this is probably true, if Popcap succeeds at brand-building.)

A few other things mentioned by the panelists in general: there needs to be more editorial coverage of casual games, developers need to do a better job of supporting their brands (financially and otherwise) in order to combat clones, and there are too many single-player casual games. The argument was also made that casual game clones are no more “exact copies” than Quake was an “exact copy” of Doom.

Oh, and as a total aside: I heard from a friend that Warren Spector told a group of academics that he’d rather students get a liberal arts degree than a “game design” degree. I appreciate the sentiment. Hopefully universities will always make an effort to channel students towards creative writing, film studies, engineering, psychology, and business courses (etc), not just the game-specific stuff. There’s time for both.

GDC: Mobile Operator Spotlight Panel

First day of GDC down, four to go. I was bouncing like a pinball between the workshops, Serious Games Summit, GDC mobile, and meet-ups with friends. What a great conference.  :-)

The session that most caught my attention today was the “Mobile Operator Spotlight Panel”, moderated by Seamus McAteer of M:Metrics and packed with executives from Sprint, Orange, Virgin, Cingular, Vodafone, and Verizon.

First, some interesting facts revealed during the panel:

  • Orange is currently reaping the highest average price for games ($7.32, as opposed to $5.62 for Sprint and $6.27 for Verizon). No word on volume.
  • M:Metrics research shows a huge disconnect between mobile game offerings and projected consumer demand. Current supply of sports and action titles exceed projected demand by a factor of two. On the other hand, the supply of games in most other genres meets half (or less than half) of projected near-term demand. That includes: arcade puzzle, board, card, casino, FPS, quiz, word, and retro arcade games. Quite a list! And this isn’t a “low demand / even lower supply” thing — the arcade puzzle, card, and casino game categories had the highest projected demand of all categories on the list. That’s 150-200 games worth of demand for each category, as opposed to just 75 games worth for the saturated action category.
  • In 1/06, Jamdat controlled ~25.4% of all US mobile game download volume. No real news here other than “Jamdat is still the gorilla.”

Second — I was struck by the universal agreement among the operators that brand / franchise power was all that mattered in the mobile games space. Along these lines, Jason Ford (from Sprint) claimed that if he cut his offerings from 435 games to 50, sales would probably remain the same. Tim Harrison (Vodafone) spoke passionately about bringing major game brands into the European market. Ken Ruck (Virgin Mobile) quipped: “Pitfall came out before my kids were born; it isn’t relevant to them.” It went on and on like this.

Ironically, in a previous session, Mitch Lasky of Jamdat/EA said “It’s crazy that games like Tetris and Madden are getting the same attention from carriers as some Chinese whack-a-mole game.” You’d think that the across-the-board operator fascination with franchises would be enough for Jamdat. (One also wonders if Mitch registered the irony of comparing Tetris to some “crazy Chinese whack-a-mole game” — after all, Tetris was a crazy Russian block game not too long ago.)

To me, this all seems like a pretty serious failure of imagination. Recognizeable brands are powerful, yes, but they blow everything else away in part because, quite frankly, purchashing systems for mobile games are terrible! It’s difficult to find anything worthwhile outside of the top games displayed by a carrier. Users are given almost no ability to quickly and conveniently demo and rate games (which would permit obscure but enjoyable titles to bubble up and get noticed by other users, creating a virtuous cycle). And mechanisms for viral marketing are still in their infancy; most games / platforms don’t make it terribly easy for a consumer to quickly share a game with many other consumers.

Part of the problem has to do with the many different handsets on the market, of course. When it takes 700 versions of a game to cover the majority of the phones out there, everthing becomes dramatically more complicated than it should be. But you can only blame so much on the handsets. Bad shopping / rating interfaces can’t be blamed on handsets. Lack of cooperation between operators (to better enable viral marketing across the population) can’t be blamed on handsets. “Long tail economics” is not a pointless cliche. When you facilitate it, it works. When you bury content underneath a mountain of bad UI, it doesn’t.

(BTW, sorry if this reads a bit rough. I need sleep badly.)