Monthly Archives: November 2009

Inside Social Games estimates that offers are generating 30% of social game revenues in 2009 in the US. Gameloft is de-emphasizing Android development. Their rationale: “We are selling 400 times more games on iPhone than on Android.” While its well … Continue reading

Thoughts on NDAs

The following article should not be taken as legal advice. I am not a lawyer. You’re welcome to discuss my opinions with your lawyer, of course.  ;-)

NDAs, aka “non-disclosure agreements,” are common to every industry, but the video game industry has a special fascination with them. We fear that our ideas will be stolen. We worry about alerting competitors to our plans (and thus giving them time to respond more effectively.) We worry about losing control of the marketing message.

Your idea isn’t as sacred as you think it is

In general, we worry excessively — particularly about the theft of our precious ideas. The overlap between companies who will steal raw ideas and companies who are competent enough to execute upon them is very, very small. And the number of ideas that are genuinely worth stealing is even smaller.

Don’t confuse the theft of ideas with game cloning — the latter is common because execution has already taken place and the market for the idea has been proven. Executing on a design and proving out a market are hard things to do, and only the best companies (Valve, Blizzard, etc) successfully do so on a regular basis.

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On EA’s Acquisition of Playfish

I wrote the following brief, high-level news analysis for a multi-industry expert network that I joined earlier this year; figured some of you might like to read it.

EA has just acquired social-network games maker Playfish for $275 million, plus an additional $25 million in equity retention arrangements and up to $100 million in additional cash contingent upon future performance. Playfish is one of the top three game developers in this space, the others being Zynga and Playdom (both privately held.) Zynga is widely rumored to be targeting an IPO within a year, leaving only Playdom as a wild card.

Why would EA pay such a large sum for a company that was only founded in 2007? In fact, one could argue that Playfish doesn’t even possess particularly distinctive IP and that its games are easily cloned (as Zynga demonstrated when it created “Cafe World” — a close copy of Playfish’s hit game “Restaurant City.” Cafe World now has 28 million monthly active users on Facebook, as compared to 18 million for Restaurant City.)

The answer is complicated. On one hand, big video game publishers have a history of overpaying for top development studios. But on the other hand, while social-network games may seem like simple things, they are in fact dramatically different from the video games that publishers like EA have built their businesses around. EA is, in part, acquiring expertise.

The traditional big video game publishers rose to prominence in part because they were capable of funding the development of robust, complex, multi-million dollar video games and in part because of their retail marketing and distribution prowess. In short: they are very good at getting people below the age of 35 to pay $30 to $60 for a boxed game that can be enjoyed alone on the couch or at the desk or with friends online. But social-networking games, by contrast, require a completely different product development and product marketing skill set. These games are free to play and generate revenue via optional microtransactions — they must be designed explicitly for the purpose of driving such transactions, as opposed to traditional games which can simply “be fun to play.” Furthermore, the core gameplay mechanic of any good social-network game must encourage players to invite their friends into the game — again, it cannot simply be “fun.” And of course, there’s no retail shelf to position a social-network game on; instead, developers must rely on non-traditional advertising, on the viral mechanics of their games, and on cross-promotion between online games to drive traffic.

This latter point is critical. The top social-network game developers have become very effective at driving players from their existing games to their new games. This means that they are essentially capable of helping any new title reach a critical mass of players almost immediately, and for “free.” From that point forward, if the game is designed well enough (i.e. if it is highly viral and good at engaging and retaining players), it will succeed.

So why did EA purchase Playfish? Because EA’s game designers are not accustomed to building games that focus mainly on viral design or on monetization via microtransactions. Because EA’s marketing people are not intimately familiar with the techniques necessary to market these non-traditional games to these non-traditional audiences. And because Playfish offers an established network of players that future games can be cross-promoted to. Of course, it certainly doesn’t hurt that Playfish is rumored to already be generating $50 million a year in revenue. Lastly, Playfish was likely the “cheapest” of the three established game developers in this space.

One could certainly argue that it would have been cheaper for EA to spin up one, two, or even three independent studios and charter them with experimenting in the social-network game space (especially if they’d had the foresight to do so two years ago.) Eventually, one studio would have hit on a successful formula, just as Playfish did. And perhaps other major publishers, such as Activision, should be considering such a strategy. But EA’s acquisition of Playfish certainly makes sense… it simply remains to be seen whether they overpaid or not.

Nintendo finally acknowledges the possibility that demos “might” help stimulate Wiiware sales; now if they just fix their most basic merchandising and UI issues, they’ll… still be way behind the 360 in the downloadable arena. But on the positive front, … Continue reading

Happy Dogs

My friend Terry took these fantastic photos of my dogs, Pooka (the white one) and Keiko (the black one). They were simply too good not to share. Check out the dirt that Pooka is kicking up in the first photo — she’s one mean running machine! :-)

pookabull
doggie-yingyang
pookajoy

The Death of Lead Gen?

It’s been a while since any given news story caused five different people to spontaneously email me. The latest story to do so is the Techcrunch exposé of scam artists who are working through the popular lead generation services (such as Offerpal) that are used by most major social gaming companies.

The story has already inspired quite a few responses, such as these thoughtful articles by Andrew Chen and Justin Smith, and this entirely predictable response by Mark Pincus, the CEO of Zynga.

My quick two cents: have the lead generation services (and therefore the social gaming companies, and therefore Facebook itself) benefited from the behavior of scam artists? Yes, absolutely. Should the lead generation services immediately do something to address the problem (and if not them, then the social gaming companies or Facebook itself?) Yes, absolutely. Does Facebook “deserve to be sued”, as one of my good friends suggested to me? No, it does not. Does this whole thing prove that social games are a house of cards? I highly doubt it.

Facebook is a popular open ecosystem, and like any other popular open ecosystem, it will be exploited from time to time by unethical people. There is always the argument that Facebook “could be doing more” to police the ecosystem (and in fact, it had already announced a plan to do precisely that as part of larger changes to the platform) but at the end of the day you simply cannot compare Facebook to the Playstation, to Wal-mart, or to any other closed ecosystem. Facebook has an essentially unlimited number of “content partners,” and while it should keep a close eye on the biggest of those partners, it is inevitable that some shadiness will eventually slip past the Facebook Police.

Sony and Wal-mart, on the other hand, have the advantage (and the great burden!) of controlling everything that enters their virtual and/or physical shelves… and they have much smaller shelves. So while I hope that Facebook will indeed do a better job of catching scams in the future, I don’t blame it, and in fact I hope it chooses to emphasize crowdsourcing techniques (i.e. better enabling users to flag and stifle abusive 3rd parties) as much as expanded police squads.

The social gaming companies turned a blind eye to their part in this problem, and now they are catching flack as they deserve. But this will blow over, and lead generation will likely continue to represent a significant percentage of their ongoing revenue. Why? Because at the end of the day, there are legitimate advertisers, content providers, and 3rd party networks with a vested interest in the success of this model. These aren’t all late-night, 1-800-type con-men; these are advertisers like Netflix, FTD, and GAP and product/service providers like Apple, The Wall Street Journal, and The New York Times. The only “house of cards” here is the house that Tattoo Media built.